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In recent years countries have  invested significant amounts  of 
political capital in efforts to coordinate  trade and industrial policy. 
Examples  include  the  recent U.S.  - Canada  free  trade  agreement  and  the 
European attempt  to complete  the  EC  internal market by  1992.  The 
design of welfare  improving policy reform is complicated by the 
presence of policy-induced distortions  and by the  imperfectly 
competitive nature of many  industries.  This paper  examines 
complications  that arise when  reform is carried out under conditions of 
imperfect competition. 
The  principal conclusion of the analysis is that limited 
cooperations,  as  occurs  in customs  unions,  may  be worse  for members  of 
the union than no  cooperation.  This possibility arises because 
comparison of welfare  in the  two  situations  (with and without 
cooperation)  amounts  to  a  comparison of two  second-best equilibria. 
We  model  the situation where  the  countries  that form  the union  (i.e., 
cooperate)  attempt  to coordinate production and export tax policy,  and 
in that way  to alter the  incentives  faced by  imperfectly competitive 
firms.  By  assumption,  these  firms  produce  for export only. 
The  first model  considers  the case where  n  firms,  each of which  is 
identified with a  single country,  choose  output,  taking their rivals' 
output and trade policies as  given;  the exporters  compete  for  the 
market of a  third country.  Governments  have  an incentive  to subsidize 
domestic production to  increase  the  domestic  share of oligopoly 
profits.  Countries  that form  a  union internalize a  portion of the 
negative externality that their subsidy has  on  industry profits.  The 
union members  can not credibly commit  to using the  subsidy that they 
would have  chosen had the union not been formed.  Consequently,  a  small 
union may  be worse  for  the member  countries  than no  union. 
In the  second model  we  analyze  the case 'where  two  large countries 
(firms)  produce  for export to  the Rest of World,  where  the excess 
demand  is a  fixed function of price.  The  cost of production in each 
exporting firm depends  on a  previous decision,  such as  investment in 
capital or R&D.  Prior to selecting the production policy, 
governments  choose  an investment tax or subsidy non-cooperatively;  this 
affects  investment,  which  is chosen prior to  the  announcement  of the 
production policy.  Cooperation in setting production  (export)  taxes 
alters the  incentives  in setting investment policies;  this is the 
source of the possibility of disadvantageous  cooperation. 
A third model  show that the  above  conclusions  tend to be 
strengthened if the  excess  demand  function in ROW  is endogenous,  as  may 
occur is investment decisions  in ROW  depend  on whether or not a  union 
forms. 
Movements  toward cooperation are achieved by costly negotiations. 
These negotiations are entered with the understanding that a  completely 
cooperative agreement is unlikely to emerge.  There  is,  however, 
usually the  implicit belief that partial cooperation represents  a  step 
in the right direction.  This belief is too optimistic.  Partial 
cooperation can be worse  than no  cooperation. Postal Address: 
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The --Welfare  Effects of Imperfect Harmonization 
of Trade and  Industrial Policy 
Introduction 
In  recent  years  several  countries  have  invested  significant 
amounts  of  political  capital  in  efforts  to  coordinate  trade  and 
industrial policy.  Examples include the  recent U.S.-Canada free  trade 
agreement,  and  the  European  attempt  to  complete  the  E.C.  internal 
·lJ 
market  by  the  year  1992.  The  design  of  welfare  improving  policy 
reform  is  complicated  by  the  presence  of  a  large  number  of 
policy-induced  distortions  and  by  the  imperfectly  competitive  nature 
of many industries. 
The  question of  policy  reform in  the presence of fixed  distoriions 
when  markets are competitive  is  a  well-studied  problem  in  the  theory 
of  the  second  best.  Recent  contributions  to  the  literature  jnclude 
HaUa  (1977),  Fukushima  (1979),  and  Dbdt  and  Newbery  (1985).  The 
general  conclusion  is  that  the  nominal  reduction  of  a  set  of 
distortions,  holding  other  distortions  fixed,  does  not  necessarily 
improve  welfare.  This  conclusion,  which  arises  because  the  reform 
occurs  in  a  second-best  e~yironment,  certainly  survives  the 
introduction of imperfect competition. 
This  paper  examines  additional  complications  that  arise  when 
reform is carried out under conditions  of imperfect competition.  This 
subject,  which  is  of  general  theoretical  interest,  is  also  of  immediate 
practical interest  due  to  the  current attempts  to  harmonize  European 
trade  policy. 
The  principal  conclusion  of  the  analysis  lS  that  limited 
cooperation,  as occurs  in  customs  unions,  may  be  worse  for  members 2 
of  the  union  than  no  cooperation.  This  possibility  arises  because 
comparison  of  welfare  under  the  two  situations  (no  cooperation  and 
partial  cooperation)  amounts  to  a  comparison  of  two  second-best 
Such  a  comparison· is,  in  general,  ambiguous.  An 
equivalent  explanation  of  the  result  is  that  different  degrees  of 
cooperation induce different games.  A  comparison of the equilibria of 
these  different  games  is,  in  general,  ambiguous.  In  view  of  these 
remarks,  the  possibility  that  limited  cooperation  may  be 
disadvantageous  is  not  surprising.  The  contribution of  this  paper  is 
to identify circumstances under which  the  possibility is likely. 
We  restrict attention  to  partial  equilibrium  models.  This  greatly 
simplifies the analysis and  has  the added advantage of allowing  us  to 
concentrate on  the role  of imperfect competition in  a  single  market.  in 
determining  the  welfare  effects  of  limited  cooperation  aIIlong 
governments.  A  general equilibrium  model  would  introduce  two  types 
of  complications  which  would  obscure  the  main  point.  First, 
distortions  in  other  markets  would  influence  the  welfare  effects  of  a 
policy  change  in  the  market  under  study.  This  raises  the  types  of 
second-best  considerations  familiar  from  the  st.udy  of  competitive 
markets,  alluded  to  above.  ~ec.9.nd,  a  general  equilibrium  framework 
makes it  necessary  to  consider the  effects  on,  for  example,  the  factor 
markets  of  imperfect  competition  in  the  product  market. 
both  of  these  types  of  complications  are  important,  it  seems 
reasonable  to  begin with  a  partial  equilibrium  model.  This  leads  to  a 
clear  understanding  of  the  direct  welfare  effects  in  the  primary 
market. 
We  consider  the  case  where  the  countries  thal  form  the  union 
(i.e.,  cooperate)  attempt  to  coordinat.e  trade  policy,  and  in  that  way 3 
to  alter  the  incentives  faced  by  imperfectly  competitive  domestic 
industries.  By  assumption,  these industries, each  of which  is  treated 
as  a  single  firm,  produce  for  export  only.  This  simplifies  the 
analysis  by  making  it  unnecessary  to  take  into  account  consumer 
welfare.  Since  export  enhancement  appears  to  be  an  important 
objective  of  many  governments,  and  since  relatively  little  weight  is 
apparently  attached  to  consumers'  interests,  the  assumption  provides 
a  reasonable starting point. 
We  analyze  three  variations  of  a  partial  equilibrium  trading 
model. (1)  These  variations  illustrate  different  reasons  why  limited 
cooperation  may  be  worse  than  no  cooperation  for  members  of  a 
union.  For  each  of  the  models,  we  study  complete  information 
subgame perfect equilibria. 
Section  1  considers  the  case  where  n  firms,  each  identified  with 
a  different  country,  choose  output,  taking  their  rivals'  output.  and 
domestic  trade  policies  as  given.  Governments  have  an  incentive  to 
subsidize  domestic  production  in order to  increase  the  domestic  share 
of  excess  profits  (Brander  and  Spencer,  (1985)].  Each  country's 
subsidy  has  a  negative  externality  on  other  count.ries.  Union 
members  internalize  a  portion. 0(.  these  externalities,  making  it  optimal 
for  them  to  decrease  t.he  subsidy;  a  sufficiently  large  union  will  tax 
its  members.  In  equilibrium,  members'  welfare  is  non-monotonic  in 
the  size of  the  union:  a  small  union  may  be  worse  for  countries  than 
no  union.  This  is  one  sem;e  in  which  partial cooperation  may  be 
(1)  This  partial  equilibrium  model  can  be  interpreted  as  a  simple 
general  equilibrium  model  in  which  each  nation's  utility  function 
is  of  the  form  U(x)  +  z,  where  z  is  the  numeraire  commodity. 
The  expOloting  nations  export  x  and  import  the  numeraire.  In 
such  a  model,  income  effects are absorbed  by  z. 4 
disadvantageous" compared  to  no  cooper~tlon. 
This  conclusion  extends  the  result  that  horizontal  mergers  may 
be  disadvantageous  [Salant  et al.(1983)].  It may  seem  that  since  the 
feasible  set of actions of a  union  includes the  sets of feasible  actions 
of  each  member,  the  agreement  to  cooperate  could  not  lower  welfare. 
This  reasoning  is incorrect,  and  illustrates why  intuition  gained  from 
optimization  problems  does  not carryover to  games.  The  equilibrium 
in the  game  without  a  union  is  not a  perfect equilibrium  of  the  game 
·lJ 
with  a  union. 
In the  second  section  we  analyze  the  case  where  two  large  firms 
(countries)  produce  for  export  to  the  Rest  of  World  (ROW).  The 
excess  demand  in  ROW  is  a  fixed  function  of  price.  For  example, 
production  in  ROW  may  be  0,  or  it  may  be  positive  but  compet.itiveLy 
determined.  Since  the  union  consists  of  all  non-competitive 
producers,  the  source of  disadvantageous  cooperation  in  the  previous 
model  is  now  ruled out.  The  cost of production  in  each  firm  depends 
on a  previous  decision  such as investment  in  capital or  R&D.  In  this 
section  we  assume  that  ROW's  investrmmt  is  exogenous.  This 
assumption  is  relaxed  in  the  subsequent  section.  As  in  the  first 
model,  countries  use  a  produ.ct~gn  subsidy  if  they  do  not  cooperate 
and  a  production  tax  if  they  do cooperate.  In either case,  we  assume 
that  prior  to  seleeting  the  production  policy,  governments  choose  an 
investment  tax  or  subsidy  non-cooperatively;  this  affects  investment, 
which  is  chosen  prior  to  the announcement of  the  production ,  '-"  . .;. 
5 
policy.(2) 
This  model  describes  important features of the  problems  faced  by 
negotiators  attempting  to  harmonize  European  trade  policy  by  1992 
[Gatsios and  Seabright  (1989)].  Considerable  progress  has  been  made 
in  reducing  barriers  to  trade;  however,  there  has  been less  progress 
in  reaching agreement on issues concerning  state aids and  investment 
policies.  In  the  context  of  its  1985  White  Paper  "Completing  the 
Internal  Market",  the  European  Commission  promised  to  prepare  a 
.~~ 
special paper  dealing with  the problem of state aids.  This  paper was 
to  have  been  published  in  1986.  It has  not  yet  been  prepared.  In 
fact,  it  was  not  until  February  1989  t.hat  a  comprehensive  survey 
appeared  regarding  the  extent  of  state  aids  In  the  Community 
[European  Commission  (1989)].  The  problems  Gommonly  associated 
with  reaching  agreement  on  coordination  of  output  tax/subsidies  are 
even  more  severe  when  dealing  with  investment  policies.  The  latter 
policies  are  difficult  to  define  and  to  monitor.  For  example,  if  an 
industry  receives  a  bank  loan  which  is  later  forgiven,  it  is  nearly 
impossible  to  determine  whether  this  constitutes  an  investment 
subsidy;  the  question  turns  on  the  firm's  subjective  probability,  at 
the time  the  loan  was  made,  of  ~?ing forgiven  the  loan. 
We  show  that  the  failure  to  choose  investment  policies 
cooperatively can erode  the  benefits of selting production  policies 
(2)  Spencer and  Brander  (1983)  studied  this  model,  but  they  did  not 
analyze  the  equilibrium  we  have  described.  They  considered  the 
case  where  a  single  eountry  chose  an  investment  and  then  a 
production  policy  Requentially,  and  also  the  cuse  where  both 
countries  chose  both  policiel:>  noneooperatively  at  the  initial  stage 
(before  investment  by  the  firms).  The  liming  of  the  decisions  is 
critieal; for  the  reasons  discussed  in  the  text,  we  believe  that  we 
have  selected  the  more  plausible ordering of decisions. 6 
cooperatively.  ·Indeed,  the  countries'  welfare  may  be  higher  when 
they  set  production  policies  non-cooperatively.  The  reason  for  this 
is  that  the  degree  of  cooperation  in  choosing  production  policies 
influences  the  incentives  that  the  countries  have  in  choosing  their 
investment  policies.  Cooperation  in  selting  production  policies 
involves  a  tax  on  production.  This  discourages  investment 
undertaken by  the firm.  However,  even when  production policies are 
chosen  cooperatively,  each  nation's  profits  increase  with  its  own 
.~! 
production,  given  the  level  of  investment.  Therefore  cooperation  in 
choosing  the  production  policies  is  likely  to  cause  each  country  to 
subsidize  investment.  Non-cooperation  in  choosing  prod  uction 
policies,  on  the  other  hand,  involves  a  subsidy  on  production.  This 
encourages  investment  by  the  firms.  In  this  circumstance  the 
noncooperative  choice  of  investment  policy  is  likely  to  enLail  an 
investment tax. 
For  a  given  level of investment,  cooperation  In  seLting  production 
policies  induces  the  optimal  level  of  output;  this  is  the  obvious 
source of  gains  from  cooperation.  However,  as  suggested  above,  it  is 
plausible  that  cooperation  in  choosing  pt'oduction  policies  leads  to 
larger  investment  subsidies  th.an  IS  the  case  where  production 
policies  are  set  non-cooperatively.  Morcover,  this  effect  can  be  so 
pronounced  that  in  the  former  regime  the  equilibrium  Jevel  of 
investment,  as  well  as  the  investment  subsidy  level,  IS  greater  than 
in  the  laUer.  Consequently,  it  may  be  the  case  that  the 
inefficiencies  associated  with  a  lat'ger  level  of  investment  outweigh 
the  benefits  associated  with  choosing  production  polic:ies 
cooperatively.  We  establish this  possibility  using a  linear  model. 
In  the  third  model  we  allow  ROW,  as  wen  as  lhe  pxporters,  to 7 
invest.  Therefore  the  supply function  in· ROWand,  consequently,  the 
excess  demand  facing  the  two  exporters,  depends  on  whether  or  not 
the  exporters  cooperate  in  setting  production  policies.  For  example, 
producers  in  ROW  know  t.hat  if  the  countries  cooperate  in  setting 
production policies,  then they  will  choose an output  tax;  in  this  case, 
for  a  given level of world  investment,  world  output  will  be  relatively 
low  and  world  price  relatively  high.  This  causes  producers  in  ROW 
to  increase  their  own  investment,  causing  the  excess  demand  facing 
the  two  countries  t.o  shift  in.  Partial  cooperation  may  still  be 
disadvantageous,  for  the  same  reason  as  in  the  previous  model.  In 
the  previous  model  it  is  clear  that  complete  cooperation  (i.e. 
cooperation  m  setting  bot.h  production  and  invest.ment  policies) 
increases  the  welfare  in  the  union,  relative  to  either  partial 
cooperation  Ot'  to  the  complete  absence  of  cooperation.  Surprisingly 
enough,  in  the  present  model  complete  cooperation  may  be  worse  for 
the  union  than  the  complete  absence  of  cooperation.  (We  establish 
this result by  means of an  example.)  In this case,  monopoly  power is 
disadvantageous.  The  reason  is  that  under either  partial or complete 
cooperation  it  IS  very  cosily  for  the  countries  to  discourage 
investment  in  ROW,  since  they  cannot  credibly  promise  to  keep  pt'ice 
low  except by investing  heavily. 
The  motivation  for  studying  these  three  models  is  t.hat  ·Lhe 
degree  of  cooperation  between  nations  is  not  exogenous.  Rat.her, 
movements  towards  cooperation  are  achieved  by  long  and  generally 
painful  negotiations  which  involve  considerable  political  risks.  These 
negot.iations  are  entered  with  the  understanding  thu·t  a  completely 
cooperative  agreemc-mt  is  unlikely  to  emerge.  There  is,  however, 
usually  the  implicit  belief  that  part.ial  cooperation  represents  a  step 8 
in  the  right  direction.  This  belief  is  too  optimistic.  Partial 
cooperation  may  be worse than no  cooperation. 
The  next  three  sections  develop  the  models  discussed  above  and 
eslablish  the  results  we  have  outlined.  The  conclusion  provides our 
assessment  of  the  practical  importance  of  the  results  and  elaborat.es 
the connection between this  paper and earlier work. 
1.  A  One  Period Model 
This  section  studies  a  model  in  which  world  production  is 
non-competitive  and  countries  use  production  lax/subsidies  to 
increase the  level  of  profits  accruing  to  the  domestic:  industry.  This 
attempt  to  increase  national  profits  reduces  aggreg'ate  (world) 
industry  profits.  A  union  consisting  of  a  group  of  countries 
restrains  their  individually  rational  behaviour  in  a  manner  similar  to 
that  of  a  group  of  firms  which  merge.  A  merger,  if  it  accounts  for 
too  small  a  fraction  of  the  market,  may  leave  the  merged  firms  worse 
off  [Salant  et  al.  (1983)].  A  similar  possibility  arises  :if  the  union  is 
too  small. 
Suppose  that  there  are  n  countries,  in  each  one  of  which  a  firm 
produces  a  homogeneous  pro<;lu~J.  Firms  are  identical  and  compete 
for  the  market  of  an  importing  country.  In  t.his  situation  each 
government  has  an  incentive  to  subsidise  the  (~xports of  its  domeRtic 
firm;  this  increases  its  share  in  the  market  of  the  importing 
countries  and  shifts  excess  profits  from  its  competitors  to  ;t~elf. 
[Brander and  Spencer  (1885)]. 
In  the  second  stage of the  game,  firms  choose  their output levels 
x.  to maximise  profits 11.,  treatinl, subsidies  s  parametrically.  We 
1  1 9 
asswne  that  the second order conditions hold,  i.  e.  a.  == 
1. 
and that for stability the matrix obtained from totally 
? 
a"TT. 




tiating the first order condition is diagonal  dominant,  i.  e. 
') 
a.  +  (n  - l)b.  < 0  'Vi,  where b.  a 




1  J 
'Vi, 
Now,  suppose  m  <  n  countries  form  a  union  and  choose  their 
common  subsidy  to  maximise  joint  welfare.  The  impact  of  a  union's 




as  m 
=  1 
- a  - b 
a  +  (n  - m - l)b 
a  +  (n  - l)b  > 0  ,  'Vi  €  m  (1) 
For  m =  1  equation  (1)  gives the effect on output of the subsidy in  a 
degenerate one-member  coalition. 
The impact of a  union's subsidy on  the output of  non-members  IS 
mb  <  0,  'V  k  €  (n  - m)  (a - b)[a +  (n  - l)b] 
Hereafter  the  subscript i  indicat.es  a  union  member· and  Ie  indicat.es  a 
non-union  member. 
The optimal  subsidy of a  m-member  union  maXImIses  joint.  welfare 
W  =  mW.  ,  i  €  m,  by  symmetry,  where  w.  =  TT.  - sx ..  Therefore 
m  l.  l.  l.  l. 
aw  aw. 
m  0  ~ 
l.  o.  Hence,  for  i,  j  €m  and  Ie  €  (n  m)  have  as  =  as 
.- - \ve 
m  m 
aw.  aTT.  ax.  aTT.  ax]{  ax. 
1. 
(m  1) 
1.  J  +  (n  m) 
1  ] 
0  as  =  - ax.  as  -
aX
k  as - s  as  = 
m  J  ID  m  ID 
ax.  ax . 
\vhich  impl ies,  by  noting that 
.]  1.  by  symmetry,  t.hat  as  =  as 
ID  m *  s m  = 









The  sign of s*  depends  on  the sign of the square bracl<et,  since  m 
ax. 
l.  < 0  and  as  > O. 
m 
After routine manipulations  and  by using  (1) 
and  (2)  the expression  in square bracl<et  becomes  Cm  - l)a - Cn  - l)b. 
{  \ 
For m f  [a +  Cn  - l)b]/a \'1e  have  sm  (=  O.  If the members  of the 
coalition exceed a  crucial number,  the optimal  policy of the  union  is 
to tax rather than subsidize exports  [see,  also Dixit  (1984)].  In  the 
case of linear demand,  for  instance,  export  taxes will  bl7;  used if 
m  ~  Cn  +  1)/2,  since in such  a  case  a  =  2P'  and  b  = P'. 
We  now  show  that  for  an  arbitrary  (common)  subsidy  by 
non-union  members,  the  best  response  by  the  union  enlail~  a  lower 
subsidy  than  the  m  individual  countries,  t);.tch  acting  on  i.t.s  own, 
would  have  chosen.  This  follows  by  noting  thai  (see  Appendix  A  for 
the  derivation) 
aw. 
l. 
aSi  s.=s* 
1.  m 
=  . [aXi ]-1 
as  .  m 
aTT.  ax. 
1 
•  (1  - m)  > 0  , 
(!.1  - b)[a  +  (n  - l)b] 
since  __  1_  < 0  __  1  "  0  a  - b  < 0,  a  +  (n  - 1)  b  < 0  by 
~ - ax.  'as··' 
-1.  m 
diagonal  dominance,  and  In  > 1. 
[Figure  1  about here] 
Thil;  implies  that.  lhe  equilibrium  subsidy  of  a  union  with  m  >  1 
members  is  less  than  the  common  subsidy  used  by  the  III  mt)mbp-rs  III '~- ,,:. 
11 
the equilibrium without the  union.  Figure  1  illustrates this  point. 
The  vert ical axis  gives  the  common  subs  idy of the non-members,  sl{' 
and  the  horizontal axis  gives  the subsidy of the  m  (potential)  union 
members.  The  curve sk(o)  shows  the equilibrium subsidy of the 
non-memberso  This  curve is  obtained  by  finding  the  symmetdc  Nash 
equilibrium  to  the  non-cooperative  game  among  non-members,  for  an 
arbitrary common  subsidy by the  m  potential union members.  The 
m  dashed curve s  (0)  shows  the best response of the m-member  union 
to an arbitrary  subsidy  by  non-members.  The  curves  are  downward 
sloping  since  the  goods  are  homogeneous  (and  therefore  substitutes); 
the stability assumption implies  the  relative slopes of the curves at 
the equilibrium.  The  curve s i ( .)  graphs  the synnnetric  Nash 
equilibrium  to  the  non-cooperative  game  among  the  m  potenttal  union 
members,  for  an  arbitrary  common  subsidy  by  non-members.  By  the 
previous  inequality,  this  curve  lies  to  the  r'ight  of  the  union's  best 
response  function.  Therefore,  if  the  union  forms,  tlU)  new 
equilibrium  involves  a  higher  level  of  subsidy  set  by  the  non-union 
members. 
The  next  step  is  to  show  that  the  welfare  of  an  In  member  union 
is  a  decreasing  function  of  the  subsidy  set  by  non-members.  This 
follows  from  the inequality  (see  Appendix  A  for  the  derivalion) 
= 
1  <  o  en  - b)[a  +  (n  - I)Ll 
The  possibility of losses  from  cooperalion  IS  shown  in  Figure  2. 
[Figure  2  about  bere] 12 
W C  denotes  the joint welfare of the m countries,  as  a  function  of  the 
m 
subsidy level set by the countries outside the union when  the  former 
create a  union;  ,,f1  gives the joint \'lelfare of the  ID  countries when 
m 
they  do  not  create a  union.  By  the optimality of s*,  ''1c  lies above  m  m 
• .D  S .  C  >  nc  h  c  (  t .  1  n ,  d  1  wm'  lnce  sk  sk'  \\1  ere ,sk  respec  lve y  Sk)  enotes  t  1e 
equilibrium subsidy of the countries outside the union when  the m 
countries  form  (respectively,  do not  form)  a  union,  we  see that it is 
possible that the joint welfare of the m countries is higher \'ihen  they 
do  not  cooperate rather than \"ihen  they do, 
To  show  that  this  possibility  can  indeed  exist  we  need  more 
structure in the  model.  Suppose the demand  is given  by 
p  =  1  - r  x. 
i 
1. 
where  by  the  choice  of  unit.s  of  both  prices  and  qllantiti('s  \\'('  set 
the  demand  slope  and  intercept equal  La  L  If m  < n  count.l·ie~  form 
a  union  the  non-cooperalive equilibrium  in output space is  given  by 
1 - c  +  nSm - em  - l)srn  - (n  - m)sk 
n  +  1 
where  i  £  m and  k  £  (n  - m), 
(4) 
The optimal policy of the union" (equation  (3»  is  now  given  by 
*  s  =  m 
Clearly s* 
m 
x. (n  +  I  - 2m) 
l' 
n  - m +  1 
o  C  11  +  1  _ff m  -')-- -
(5) 
Settine m = 1  1n  the  above 
formula  gives  the optimal  policy of each  country  1<  outside  the  union, 
s* 
k 
n  - 1. 
n  >  o  for  1,  £  (n  - m).  (f» 
Using  (5)  and  (6)  in  (4)  gives  the  subgame  perfect equilibrium output 13 
levels, 
x.  =  [n(n +  2  - m)  +  (1  - m)](l - c)/mA  , 
1 
? 
where  ~  =  (n- +  1)(2 +  n  - m)  +  2n(1  - m)  , 
for  i  ~ m 
and 
Xk  =  n(n +  1)(1 - ct/~  for  k  ~  (n  - m)  (8) 
(7) 
For m =  1,  xi =  xk'  the equilibrium output  levels when  there is no 
cooperation and each nation acts  independently. 
Routine  calculations  using  (7)  and  (8),  give  the  profits  net  of 
subsidy  payment,s  received  by a  firm  in  a  m-member  union 
w? 
1  =  (9) 
If there  were  no  cooperation  (m  = 1)  the  net profits of  the  same  firm 
would  be 
w~ 
l. 
o  0  ~  ~  ? 
c)-/m'~- =  n(l  - c)-/(n- +  1)-
The  joint welfare of the m countries,  being the  sum  of net 
profits accruing to  tllf~ir  domestic  firms,  \vou1d  be  given  in each case 
c 
m  h'. 
l.  and  =  In  w~. 
1  .  .-
Their  difference  is  a  function  of  m  and  is  given  by 
f(m) 
This  is  a  cubic  function  in  m.  For  ru  = 1  we  have  f(l)  = O.  So 
m  = 1  is  one  of  the  three  roots  of  the  equalion.  For  m  = n,  i.e. 
when  aU  n  countt'ies cooperate,  \  ... e  have fen)  = 
?  2  .  ? 
(1  - c)~  Cn  - 1)~ 
4(n2  +  1)2 
14 
>  o 
Cooperation  by  all  exporting  countries  is  beneficial.  To  obtain  the 
sign of the derivative of f(m)  at m  = 1  write f(m)  as 
f(m)  = 
? 
(l - c)-
?  ? 
(n- +  1)~ 
gem) 
222  2  ? 
where  gem)  = [en  +  1)  (n  +  1)  (n  +  1  - m)  - nmA  ]/~~.  The  sign of 
f'(m)  equals  that of g'(m)j  but 
g'  (m) 
??  ?  1  4 
=  -[en +  l)""(n'" + 1)~ t:.  [t:.  +  2~'n +  1  - m)]  - nt:."  J.!t:.  • 
For m = 1  the numerator of g'(l)  is equal  to 
-en  +  1)4  (n2  +  1)3  (n2  - l)(n - 1)  < 0 
Therefore, g'  (1)  < O. 
Since f'  (1)  < 0,  f(l)  = 0,  f(n)  > 0  and  f  is  a  conLinuous  function 
in  m,  there  must  be  some  value  of  m,  denoted  m:!:,  lying  bet.ween  1 
and  n  for  which  f(m*)  = O.  This  1S  unique  since  f(m)  is  a  cubic 
function  of  m  and,  therefore,  t.he  third  root  mllst  lie  outside  the 
domain  (1,  n).  (Otherwise  ther~ would  l~e  four  or,  more  generally,  an 
even  number of  roots.)  The function  f(m)  reaches  its  minimum at  m. 
Figul'e  3  below  depicts  the function  f(m). 
[Figure  3  about  here] 
We  summarise  the  results  of  Lhe  linear  model  in  th(~  following 
Propositions. 15 
Proposition  1:  For  m  f::  (1,  m*)  cooperation  is  harmful.  Cooperation 
is  beneficial  for  the  member-states  only  if the  number  of  countries 
forming  a  union is large enough  (m  > m*). 
Proposition  2:  For  those  values  of  m  between  1  and  iii  a  further 
(small)  expansion  of  an  existing  union  makes  the  situation  worse  for 
its member-states. 
2.  A  Two  Period  Model  Without  ROW  Investment 
We  modify  the previous  model  by assuming  that  there are only 
two  non-competitive firms  and that firm  i  invf:'sts  in capital,  k., 
1. 
in  the first period.  Firm i's (variable)  cost  function  is  nm  ... 
c. ex.,  1<.),  which decreases  in k.  and  increases  111  x..  ROW  is 
1  ~  1  1  1 
assumed  to  be  competitive;  in  this  case,  cooperation  by  Lhe  two 
exporters  represents  a  union  by  all  non-competitive  agents. 
Consequent..ly,  the  reasons  for  disadvant..l1geous  cooperation  cannot  be 
the  same  as  those  in  the  previous  secti.on.  Furthermore  in  this 
section  we  assume  that  investment  in  ROW  is  fixed.  This  assumption 
is  relaxed  in  the  next  section.  These  assumpt.ions  imply  that  firm  i's 
revenue  net of subsidy  (i.e.,  "social revenue")  can  be  written  as 
R. (x) j  this  is  the  revenue  corresponding  to  ROW's  res idual  demand. 
1 
The  ith component  of the vector x  :is  x .. 
1 
Hereaftel- \.;e  assume  lhat 
firms  1  and  2  l1re  identical,  and  we  consider  only  symmetric 
equilibria. 
In  period  2  firm  i  chooses output  to  maximize  gro:,;s  revenue  minus 
vnril1ble  cost,  taking  subsidies  and  it.s  rival's  output as  given.  This 
nOTl-c:oopf~raLive  galIle  induces  the  vector  of  output  functions  x  = x(s, 
k),  where  k  is  the  vector  of  investment  lev(~ls  ;:Hld  H  lhe  vector  of 16 
iQ.y.~stment  subsidies.  As  before,  Wp- assume  that  the  firms'  best 
response functions are  downward  sloping and  that the standard 
stability condition is satisfied.  Therefore an  increase in s.  or  in 
1. 
ki  increases xi  and decreases  xj '  j  ~ i. 
In period 2  country  1.  chooses  the output subsidy s.  taking  l{  as 
1 
given.  Non-cooperative behaviour by the countries  induces  the policy 
rule sn(k),  and cooperative behavior  induces  the policy rule sCCk). 
The superscripts n  and c  designate,  respectively,  non-cooperative and 
governments'  and  the firms'  equilibrium behaviour  induce the equili-
brium output functions  xt(k)  ==  x(st(k),  li:),  for  t  =  n,  c;  these 
fUllctions  correspond to non-cooperation  and cooperation between  the 
governments  in  the second period. 
(~  n 
It is straightfonllard to  show  that  s - -:  0  < s  ,  as  in  the 
previous  model.  If countries  cooperate,  they  tax  their  domestic  firms 
in  order  to  move  joint  output  to  the  monopoly  level.  If countries 
behave  non-cooperatively  they  subsidize  the  domestic  firm,  in  order 
to capture  the  monopoly  rents. 
Even  under  the  assumptions  that  lhe  Na1::ih  equilibrium  is  slable 
and  the  countries'  best  _ reHpo~se  functj?w~ are  downward  ::;loping  in 
subsidy  space,  the  comparative  stalics  of  the  model  are  ambiguous. 
The  reason  is  that  lhe  effect  of  k  on  the  equilibrium  level  of  s 
involves  second  derivatives  of  the  endogenous  function  x(s,  k).  The 
results of  this  sec  lion  are  based  on  a  linear  example,  :-;0  we  make  no 
claim  to  generality.  Before  turning  lo  the  example  we  discuss  lhe 
intuition  behind  the  rf)su1t.s.  In  onier  t.o  avoid  having"  to  consider 
every  possibility  we  adopt  the  following  LlHsumptiom"  which  InClke  lhe 
effect  of  an  increase  tn  inve~tment  on  lhe  production  subsidy unambiguous: 
AssLUnpt ion  la 
ASSlunpt ion  lb 
ale  as. 
1  1 
alL  as. 




> 0  >  J  ak.  as. 
1  J 
n  ,  evaluated at  s  (k) 
,  evaluated at  seCk), 
where  we  define W.(s,  k)  =  R. (x(s,  k»  - c.(x.(s,  k),kl )  and  1  1  1  1 
W(s,  k)  =  WI  +  W2'  Assumption  la states that at the non-cooperative 
equilibrium in production subsidies,  sn(k),  an  increase  in k.  causes 
1 
an outward  shift in the marginal  profit  to country  i  of an incn'Jase in 
its  own  subsidy,  and  a' decrease  in  the  marginal  profit  to  country  j. 
Assumption  Ib states that at the cooperative equilibr-ium  in 
production subsidies,  sC Ck),  an  increase  in k.  shifts out  the  mCll'~inal 
1 
joint profit due  to an  increase  in s.  and shifts  in  the marginal  joint 
1 
pr.ofits  due  to  an  increase  1n s.,  It IS  possible  Lo  .... rite the 
J 
assumptions  in  terms  of  the  primitive  functions  (r'esidual  demand  and 
cost)  but  the  result  is  loo  complicated  Lo  be  illuminating.  These 
assumptions are  plausible,  hold  for  the linear  mode'!'  we  discuss  below, 
and  imply: 
Proposition  3:  An  increase  in  J(.  causes  an  increase  :in  the  equili-
1. 
brium  level  of s.  und  a  (lccrease  in  the  equilibriwn level  of s., 
~  J 
regardless  of whether  or not  the counlries  cOoperate:  k.  und  ~  are  1.  -, i 
"strategic complements". 
Proof:  If the  counlries  do  not  ('{)op(~r'ate,  the sign  of ak./as.  (:'quals 
1.  1 
the sign of  l.Tll  and  the sign of  Cl]<  ./a~  •.  c(}uuls  t he sign of  I  J<) I, 
.)  1 18 
,,,here 
? 
d2W  a2w  "  - a-w  - a-w 




--2- as1ak1  aS
l  J l  =  J 2  = 
? 
a~"2  a2w 





1  .. asi 
This  follows  'from  applying  Cramer's  Rule  to  the  comparative  statics 
matrix  of  the  non-cooperative  game  between  the  governments  in  the 
second  period,  and  using  the  standard  stability  condition.  By 
assumption the best response  functions  of the governments are 
? 
dm"nward sloping in subsidy space,  so  a-WI/as. as.  < O.  Using'  the 
1  .J 
?  ? 
second order condition  a-w./as':"  < a and  Assumption  la then  implies 
~  ~ 
that  IJll  > a > I.J21.  The  proof for  the case where  the  gover'nmenls 
cooperate  in setting production subsidies  is similar. 
Q.E.D. 
An  increase in k.  causes  the marginal  cost  of firm  i  to decrease. 
1. 
If the production subsidies  \.;erc  held constant.,  the  increase  1.n  k. 
1. 
could  cause  output  In  country  i  to  increase  and  output  in  j  to 
decrease.  The  two  assl}mption.s  guarantee  that  under  either  regime, 
the  equilibrium  choice  of  production  subsidies  encourages  this 
tendency. 
In  the first period  firms  choose  investment  levels.  The  social 
cost  of investment  for  fixm  i  is  v.(k,).  Firms  pay  the  cost 
1.  1 
V.Ck.,  <P.),  where  <P.  1S  the  investment  subsidy  (a lax if negatiVe!)  In 
1.  1.  1  1. 
country  i.  In  the case of constant.  marC'inal  costs of capital,  for 
example,  we  have  v,  ==  Ji:.,  by  choice of units,  amI  V,  ==  (l - <1>,  )Ji:.. 
1.  1.  1  1  1 
In  the numerical  example it is convenient  to  US!,'  a  more  general 19 
function. 
The  investment  gmne  beh  ... een  firms  induces  the equilibrium  level 
t  of investment,  1<  = k  (4l),  for  t  = n,  c,  where  4l  is the vector of 
investment  subsidies,  and,  as  before,  the  superscript  denotes 
non-cooperation or  cooperation  in  the  choice  of  production  subsidies. 
In  all  cases  we  assume  "that  the  investment  subsidies  are  chosen 
non-cooperatively.  If firms'  best  response  functions  are  downward 
sloping in investment  space and if the  usual  stability condition  holds 
at the equilibrium,  the comparative statics are as expected:  an 
increase  in 4l.  causes  the equilibrium level of k.  to  increase and 
1  1 
causes  k.  to decrease. 
J 
In period 1  country  i  chooses  4l.,  takin~ its rival's  investment 
1 
policy  as  given,  and  recognizing  the  effect  its  own  action  will  have 
on  the  final  equilibrium.  That  is,  country  i  takes  the  in  vestment  tax 
or  subsidy  in  j  as  given,  <lnd  understands  how  its  own  in vestment 
policy  will  affect  invest.ment  levels,  and  thus  indir'ectly  affect 
production  subsidies  and  final  output.  The  non-coopera  tive 
symmetric equilibrium in  invest.ment subsidies for  the  two  r'E'g-imes  is 
4l\  t  =  c,  n. 
The  timing  In  the  !fi0del  is  import::!nt  (see  note  2).  The  model 
describes  the  situation  where  countries  attempt  t.o  creat.e  institutions 
which  will  permit  them  to cooperate on the choice of future  lrade and 
production  policies.  These institutions  must  be  sufficiently  flexible  to 
accomodate  future  chungDs;  therefore  cooperative  trade  policy  mllst 
be  conditional  on  factors  which  influence  demand  and  supply.  The 
requirement  of  subgurne  perfection  ensures  that  Uw  institutiol1l:i  do 
not  incorporate  ex  pm;t  inefficiency.  By  assumption,  the  countries 
are  not  able  to  negotiate  an  agreement  on  the  choice  of  investment 20 
policies.  This  inability  may  arise  because  of  monitoring  problems,  or 
simply  because  of  the  piecemeal  approach  adopted  m  ne,gotiating 
customs unions.  Therefore the countries  are  not able  to  avoid  the  ex. 
ante  inefficiencies  caused  by  individualistic  investment  policies.  The 
question  the  model  addresses  is whether  it is  likely  that  a  reduction 
in  ex  post  inefficiency  (cooperation  on  prod  uction  policies) 
exacerbates  the  problem  of  ex  ante  inefficiency  to  such  an  extent 
that welfare  decreases. 
Designate Jt(k)  as  the joint social welfare minus  the social cost 
t  t  t  t  t 
of investment:  J  (k)  =  WI  +  W::!  - vI  - v::!'  where  \'Ii  ::  IVi(s  (1;:),  k) 
for  t  = n,c.  Onco  again,  we  remind  the  reader  that  the  superscript.  t 
indicates  whelher or not  there is cooper"alion  in  the  second  period;  in 
both  cases  the  countries  behnve  non-cooper~li\"(-:l'y  1n  choosing 
investment  policies.  Clearly,  for any levels of  inve::;tment,  k, 
J c (1{)  '..  In  (',{) "  1ft'  t  t' ttl"  .  .  coun  rles were  0  coopera  e  on  lnves  men  po  lCles 
in  the  first  period  they  would  be  in  a  pOHition  to  induce  the  optimal 
level  of  investment  by  appropriate  choice  of  investment  policies.  In 
that  case,  second  period  cooperation  would  certainly  increase  joint 
social  welfare.  However,  if  the  countries  choose  investment  policies 
non-cooperatively,  there_ is  no. g"uaranle_e  that  cooper"alion  on  output 
policies  raises  their  welfare. 
Figure  4  about  here 
Figure  4  illustrates  a  situution  where  second  period  cooperation 
lowers  \..,elfare.  The  hori.zontal  axis  trives  li,  the  level of  investment 
in  a  symmetric equil i.brium.  The  function  .In  1 ies be  10\..,  .Ie,  for  t.he 
reason  given  above.  The  graphs  are  nrm..,n  ;)S  concrwe  in  1<.  Unner  both 21 
regimes  non-cooperation  in  selting  investment  policies  leads  to· an 
excessive  level  of  investment  in  equilibrium,  since  each  country 
maneuvers  for  a  favourable  position in the  second  stage of the  game. 
Investment  in  country  i  has  a  negative  externality  on  welfare  in  j. 
At  the  non-cooperative  equilibrium  in  investment  policies  country  i 
fails  to  take  this  externality  into  account  and  therefore  induces  a 
level of investment. greater than the  jointly optimal level.  Figure  4 
illustrates the case  where~, the equilibrium level  of investment 
given second period cooperation,  exceeds  j{n,  the equilibrium level of 
investment  given  non-cooperation  in  t.he  second  period.  The 
increased  inefficiency  induced  by  second  period  cooperation  more 
t.han  offset.s  the ex post increase  in  efficiency.  (3) 
Example:  We  show  by  example  that  the  above  discussion,  whkh  IS 
summarized in  Figure  4,  is  quite  plausible.  Let  t.he  world  inverse 
demand  function  be  linear:  p  = 1  f- e  - (Xl  -'- ;<..,)/2.  Variable  cost  is 
c.  =  [(1  - 0:  Ie)  +  y  ~<./2]x".  A  unit  increase  in  investment  causes 
1  1  1  1 
the  marginal  cosl  curve  to  shift  down  by  0:;  Y  gives  the  slope  of  the 
marginal cost curve.  The  paramet.er  e  gives  the amount  by  which  the 
demand  intercept  exce~ds  th~  l1larginaJ  cosl  of  Lhe  first  unit  of 
production when  investment  1S  zero.  The  social cost of investment is 
(3)  The  figure 5ho\  ..  5  the  investment  at \vhich  .Ie  reaches  its fll3ximwn 
lies  to  the right  of the  investment  that  fll<.lximizes  .r
ll
•  We  rC8"ord 
this  as  the  likely  situation,  but  it  1S  nol  important  to  our 
argument.  If  countries  do  not  co()per~te  in  setUng  the 
production  policy,  a  lower  level  uf  inve~lmenl provides  a  partial 
substitute  for  a  commitment  not.  t.o  use  large  subsidies.  This  is 
due  to  the  assumption  of  strategic  cOlllplementarity  between 
production subsidies and  investment.  This  indirect  commitment  i~~ 
not  needed  when  firms  know  that  their  guvernments  will 
cooperate  in  setting  production  policy. 22 
quadratic  in Ie  v.  = (1  +  I?  k.j2)lc.  There are  bom  interpretations 
1  ·11 
for this function.  The first is that the  investment  function  incor-
.., 
porates nonlinear  adjustment  costs,  given by  I?  k~j2;  adjustment  costs 
1. 
are commonly  invoked  to  explain  why  the  level of capital stock  is  not 
in  long  run  equilibrium  at  every  point  in  time,  i.e.,  to  explain  why 
adjustment  is  not  instantaneous.  The  second  interpret.ation,  which 
gives  a  general  equilibrium  flavour  to  the  model,  is  that  firms  face 
an  upward  sloping  cost  function  of  capital.  (4)  With  the  second 
interpretation, p  gives  the  slope  of  the  supply curve  for  capital.  We 
assume  that  countries  use  a  unit  production  subsidy  ILax  and  a  unit 
investment subsidy/tax,  so that firm  i's cost of investment is 
V.  = (1  - ¢.  - I?  k./2)k  .. 
1  11.1 
These  functional  forms  are  chosen  for  their  simplicity,  SInce  the 
objective  IS  to  demonstrate  that  cooperation  in  choo::;ing  pt'oduction 
subsidies  can  be  disadvantageous.  The  formulae  for  tht:!  equilibrium 
policy  rules and  the  players'  payoffs are sufficiently  complicated  that 
they  defy  closed  form  analysis  even  for  these  SilllPl{~  functions.  This 
is  because  there  are  four  steps  (stagel3)  in  the  game,  and  also 
because  the  domain  of  the  parameter  values  must  bn  stich  ~lS  to 
ensure  that  each  agenl~s  prog,ramme  i8_ concave.  Fer  example,  it  1:':; 
necessary  to  choose  I?  not only  positive,  but also  sufficiently large  to 
guarantee  concavity;  this  precludes  simplifying  the  model  by 
examining  the  limiting  case  where  I?  = O.  The  equilibrium  formulae, 
(4)  Given  the  Gecond  interpretation of v.,  tIl(!  model  could be 
l. 
extended by  assumin~ that  there  is  a  \\lorld market.  for  :investment 
goods,  so  that  v.  would  depend  on  both k.  and Ii.  This  exten-
1.  1  J 
sian would  be  straightfon\lard,  but  is  tnnccntial  to  our main 
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and  t.heir  derivMion,  are  provi.ded  in  Appendix  B.  For  the  results 
reported  below,  lhe  paramet.ers  a,  0:,  p  and  Yare chosen  so  that.  each 
agent.'s  problem  is  concave  and  so  that  the  decisions  result  in 
positive  prices  and  production and  positive  levels  of  k  less  t.han  1/0: 
(so  that marginal cost.  of output is  everywhere  positive(5)). 
[Table  1  about here] 
Table  1  summarizes  the  chief  results  for  a  range  of  values  of  Y, 
the  slope  of  t.he  marginal  cost.  of  product.ion,  and  for  the  paramet.er 
values  e  = 4,  p  = 2,  0:  = 1.  For  small  values  of  Y,  second  period 
cooperat.ion  is  disadvantageous.  If t.he  marginal  cost.  curve  is  very 
steep,  partial cooperation  benefits  lhe  members of  t.he  union. 
The  possibilit.y  of  disadvantageous  cooperation  arises  because  the 
incentives  to  overinvest  are  very  sensitive  to  the  production 
subsidies.  Whether or  not  lhe  countries cooperate  in  the  second 
(5)  This  last.  rest.riction  is  unnecessarily  st.rong.  It makes  sense  to 
consider  levels  of  investment.  for  which  margi.nal  cost.  is  negative 
at.  low  levels  of product.ion,  provided  that at  Lhe  equilibrium  level 
of  production  marginal  cost  and  total  COI5t.  are  both  positive. 
That  is,  since  the  lin~ar..  model  can  be  regarded  as  an 
approximation,  it  makes  sense  to  consider  cal5es  where  t.he  linear 
marginal  cost.  curve  intersect.s  the  quantity  axis  at  a  positive 
level.  If  we  choose  parameter  values  t.o  satisfy  the  wp-aker 
restriction  that  marginal  and  total  cost  are  positive  al  the 
equilibrium  (rather  than  positive  for  all  lev(,:,ls  of  pt'oduction), 
results  much  more  ext.reme  t.han  those  presentud  in  table  ]  can 
be  found.  For  example,  for  a  = 4,  Y  = .05,  f?  = 2  and  ex  = 1.1. 
(rat.her  than  <X  =  1  as  1TI  Table  1),  the  equilibrium  levp-l  of 
investment.  under  second  period  cooperation  results  i.n  negative 
marginal  cost.  for  low  levels  of  production.  However,  al  lhe 
equilibrium  level  of  production  both  marginal  and total  cosl  are 
positive.  The  ratio of  social  welfare  with  (~ooperation  to  social 
h'f..'lfare  \  .. i thout  cooperat ion  p*c/.J*I1)  is  then  .71.  For  this 
example,  second  period  cooperation  results  in  a  loss  of  welfare  of 
almost  10%. 24 
period,  the equilibrium  production subsidy received  by country  i  is 
an  increas  ing  (linear)  ftmction of k 0  and  a  decreas  ing fund  ion  of 
1. 
k o'  That  is,  Assumptions  la and  Ib  are satisfied by  the linear 
J 
model.  In  this  sense,  the  governments'  intervention  in  the  second 
per.iod  enhances  the  firms'  incentive  to  invest  for  strategic  reasons. 
Although  the  qualitative effects are the  same  with  and  'without second 
period cooperation, there is  a  considerable difference in degree. 
For  example,  for  y  = .95 and  the  base parameter values  shown in 
Table  1,  when  the countries do  not  cooperate,  a  $1  increase  in  lei 
causes approximately a  .07  (dollar)  increase in the  production subsidy 
for  i  and  a  .02  decrease in the subsidy for  j; when  the countries  do 
cooperate,  a  $1  increase in ko  causes  a  decrease of  .18  in i's 
1. 
production  tax  (i.e.,  an  increase  in  the  negative  subsidy)  and  an 
increase  of  .35  in  j's  production  tax.(6)  The  difference  between  the 
two  regimes  (second  period  cooperation  and  non-cooperalion),  i.n  the 
equilibrium  incentives  (i.e.,  the  effect  of  investment  on  the 
production subsidy),  decreases  with larger  values of  Y. 
A  small  value  of  Y  (i.e.,  a  relatively  flat  marginal  cost  of 
production curve)  encourages  high output;  small changes  in 
(6)  Notice  that  since  the  equilibrium subsidy  rules are  linear  in  k, 
the results described  in  the  text  imply  that as. jaIL  :;.  -as .jalL 
1.  1.  J  1. 
in  the  non-cooperative  case.  Thi.s  means  that  the  best  response 
function  of government  i  intersects that of government  j  in 
(s 0'  so)  space  from  above;  that  is,  the standard stability 
J  1 
condition  is  met.  Of  course,  it  is  not  clear  that  this  stability 
cono.ition  has  any  releVance  in  a  mulListage  game,  sl.1ch  as  we  arp 
considering.  When  the  governments cooperate  in  the  second 
stage,  t he  above  inequuli  t y  regar-ding  t he partials  0 f  S  0  and  s  0  is 
..  1  J 
reversed.  However,  when  the  government.s  cooperate  they  solvp 
a  maximization  problem,  so  there  is  no  question  of  invoking  a 
~lability condition  at.  this stage. 25 
investment,  which  lead  to  changes in  the  marginal cost of production, 
cause  a  relatively  large  reallocation  in  the  jointly  optimal  implicit 
quota  for  each  firm.  Since  the  firms  behave  non-cooperatively,  this 
requires  a  large change  in  the  production  tax  (by  which  IIleans  firms 
are  induced  to  accept  the  implicit  quota).  The  sensitivity  (to 
investment  levels)  of  the  production  tax  rule  gives  each  government 
an  incentive  to  subsidize  investment.  When  the  governments  behave 
non-cooperatively  in  the  second  period  the  implicit  quota  is  not 
.!t~ 
jointly  optimal;  in  our  example  this  has  the  effect  of  making  the 
equilibrium  production  subsidy  received  by  firm  j  less  sensitive  to 
the  level· of  investment.  in  firm  i.  This  lessens  the  governments' 
incentive  to  encourage  investment  in  the  first  period.  For  large 
values of  y  the optimal implicit  quota  is  small and  is  leRs  sensitive  t.o 
changes  in  marginal  cost  caused  by  changes  In  investment.  Thi~ 
decreases  the  incentives  governments  have  to  subsidi;"e  i.nveHtment; 
in  this  case,  second  period  cooperation  1!:l  1c:,;s  likely  to  be 
disadvantageous. 
For  all  the  simulaLions  we  performed  using  the  linear  model, 
second  period  cooperation  causes  governments  to  subsidize 
investment in  the  first  perioq;  second  period  non-cooperution  causes 
governments  to  tax investment in  the first  period(7);  that is 
~n < 0  < ~c.  This  result  is consistent  with  the previous  discussion 
on the goveJ'nments'  incentives  t.o  tax or  subsjdi~~e investment;  the 
(7)  Spencer and  Brander  (lD8:3)  showed  t.hal,  if  a  single  country  used 
a  production  and  investment  policy,  t.hey  would  subsidize 
production  and  t.ax  investment  ina  perfect  equillbriuIn.  Thus, 
our  result  shows  that  a  non-coopernlivf~  game  between 
governments  leads  t.o  f.he  !:lallICo'  type of  behaviour,  at.  l\~ast  for  the 
linear  model. 26 
result is also  due  to  the  fact  that  second  period  cooperation  leads  to 
a  production  tax,  whereas  non-cooperation  involves  a  production 
subsidy.  Under  cooperation,  for  example,  firms  are  discouraged  from 
investing  due  to  the  expectation  of  a  production  taxi  the  investment 
subsidy offsets this effect. 
In  all  the  simulations,  the  equilibrium  level  of· investment  is 
higher  when  there  is  second  period  cooperationi  this  is  the  case 
x-egardless  of  whether  joint  welfare  is  higher  under  second  period 
.:" 
cooperation.  In  addition,  the  output  price  is  always  higher  under 
second  period  cooperationi  that  is,  the  decreased  cost,  induced  by 
the  higher  investment,  is  not  sufficient  to  cause output  to  be  higher 
under  second  period  cooperation.  The  conclusion  18  that  the 
consuming  nations  are  always  hurt  and  producing  n::lt.ions  are  likely 
to  be  hurt by  second  period  cooperation. 
The  choice  of  units  allows  us  t.o  set  the  demand  .:;lu[Jco'  :'t,ld  the 
intercept  of  the  marginul  cost,  when  \{  =  0,  ~wt.h  equal  La  one. 
Changes  in  e,  which  alter  the  demand  inter'ccpt,  cause  the  equilibrium 
level  of  investment  La  change,  but  do  nuL  substantially  aller  Lhe 
relative advantage of  second  period  cooperation. 
For  small  values  of  t>  il~e _.maxirnizaLiun  problem  of  some  agent 
becomes  convex,  and  the  game  has  no  interior  equilibrium.  for  ];.trge 
values  of  t>  investment  is  very  costly.  In  this  c~.u;e  Lhe  incentivuH, 
created  by  second  pel'iod  (:ooperation,  to  ~;ubsidizc  inve:,;tment.,  have 
very  little  effecL  on  the  uquilibrium  outcome  of  the  g:lIue,  and  second 
period  cooperation  is  advanLageous  for  all  values  of  Y.  This  is  easy 
to  see  in  the  limiting  ca~e of  t>  -+  co,  wher!:  jn veHlrnent . is  alwnys  zero 
and  cooperation  in  ~mt.tjng  production  subsidieH  is  equivalent  t.o  full 
cooperation. "",;. 
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An  increase" in  the  parameter  <X  increases  the  value  of  a  unit  of 
capital,  since  for  large  <X  an  extra unit of capital  causes  the  marginal 
cost  to  shift  down  more.  For  small  <X  capital  has  little  value,  either 
to  reduce  costs  or  for  strategic  purposes.  (For  small  0:  the  subsidy 
rule  is  not  sensitive  to  capital;  this  is  apparent  from  equation  (B.4) 
of Appendix  B,  which  shows that capital  levels and  0:  interact linearly 
in  the  subsidy  rule).  Therefore,  for  small  0:  governments  have  little 
incentive  to  subsidize  investment,  and  second  period  cooperation  is 
.J,~ 
not  likely  to  be  disadvantageous.  This  is  easy  to  see  in  the  limiting 
case  where  <X  -+  0;  there,  investment  is  zero  and  cooperation  In 
setting  production  subsidies  is  equivalent  to  full  cooperation.  For 
large  values  of  0:  second  period  cooperation  is  more  likely  to  be 
disadvantageous  SInce  the  incentive  to  ~ubsidize  invest.ment 
increases.  (See  footnote  5)  However,  for  very  large  values  of  0:  one 
or more agent's  maximization  problem  becomes  convex. 
Keeping  in  mind  the  restrictions  on  the  domain  uf  0:,  I?  and  y 
discussed  above,  ',ve  summarize  the  comparative  st.c.ttic  results  fat'  the 
linear  model  in  the  following  proposition: 
Proposition  4:  If a  unit  of  inye§tment  is  very  expensi.ve  (brge  I?)  or 
not very  effective  in  reducing  costs  (small  0:)  there  is  little  incentive 
to  invest  ::md  cooperation  in  setting  only  production  policies  is 
unlikely  to  be  disadvantageous.  If,  on  Uw  other  hand,  investment  IS 
either  inexpensive  or  very  effective  in  reducing  costs,  governments 
creaLe  large  inefficiencies  by  subsidizing  domestic  invc::;tmenL;  these 
efficiencie::;  are  nxacerbat.ed  by  cooperat.ion  i.n  :,;ctting  production 
policies,  and  such  cooperaLion  is  likely  to  reduce  wI:lfare.  For  given 
levels  of  I?  and  0:,  second  period  cooperation  is  mor'e  likely  to  be 28 
disadvantageous --if  the marginal cost of production rises  slowly. 
3.  A  Two-Period  Model  with  ROW  Invest.ment 
The  previous  section  assullied  t.hat  ROW's  investment  was 
exogenous,  which  meant  tha:t  the  excess  demand  function  facing  the 
two  firms  was  independent  of  whether  the  countries  fbrmed  a  union 
which  entailed  setting  trade  policy  optimally.  This  section  assumes 
that  there  is  the  possibility  for  investment  in  ROW,  as  in  the  two 
exporting countries.  In  this case,  the  equilibrium  level  of investment 
in  ROW,  and  hence  the  excess  demand  curve  facing  the  firms, 
depends  on  both  the  level  of  investment  by  t.he  two  firms  and  on 
whether  the  countries  will  cooperat.e  in  the  second  period.  As  in  the 
previous  model,  for  given  levels  of  investment.  by  all  producers,  t.he 
equilibrium price  is  higher  when  the  exporting countries  cooperate  m 
the  second  period;  t.he  reason  is  that  cooper::ltion  involve::;  '-\ 
production  lax.  Therefore  cooperation  Hl  selling  production  poliGies 
induces  great.er  investment.  in  ROW,  for  a  given  level  of  investment 
by  the  two  firms:  second  period  cooperation  causes  the  excess 
demand  curve  to  ::;hift  m.  This  effect  compounc.b  the  incentive 
problem  discussed  in  t.he  preyi(:~lS  section,  :_l.nd  makes  it  more  likely 
that partial cooperation  is  disadvantageous. 
One  \"ay  t a  see  t his  is to  rep  J ace  t he  social  p:1yoff  funct ions  J t 
graphed  in  Figure  4  by  the  functions  J*l(l;:,  k~(k», where  I\~(I;:)  is 
the  equilibrium  level  of  investment  in  ROW  for  a  given  common  level 
of  inveHtrnenl,  k,  by  the  two  firms,  for  l  = e,n  (which,  as  before, 
correspond  to  cooperation and  non-cooperation  in  :;etlin/J  peoduct.ion 
policies).  Since  I{~(l{)  ),  I{~(l{),  by  the  nrrrument  ;n  th(~  prp.viuU!, 29 
paragraph,  and since  a.r*t  /al<r  < 0  (since an  increase in kr shifts down 
the residual  demand  curve facing  the  two  exporters),  the vertical 
distance between J*c  and J*n  tend..c;  to be  less than  the distance 
between  the  functions  in figure  4.  This tends  to  make  second  period 
cooperation less advantageous.  It may  for  example  be  the case that 
for  some  values  of k  J*n lies above J*c.  (This  ccmnot  occur when 
investment  in  ROW  is fixed.)  If this occurs where  J*c  reaches  its 
maximum  then  it  may  be  the  case  that  the  countries  are  worse~1  off 
cooperating  in  both  periods  than  behaving  non-cooperatively  in  hoth 
periods. 
In order to  demonstrate this possibilit"y,  we  lake an extreme 
e~{8mple,  in which J*n  lies above  J*c for all values  of k(8).  Suppose 
that  production  in  ROW  occurs  at  constant  marginal  co::;t,  which  for 
simplicity  we  take  to  be  0,  up  to  some  capacity  level;  a  unit  of 
capacity  can  be  purc~ased by  ROW  for  the  constant  marginal  cost  (3. 
Production  in  the  two  count.ries  occurs  under  incr'easing  raar'ginal 
cost,  which  can  be  reduced  by  first  period  investment  (as  in  the 
previous  section).  This  describes  a  situation  where  ROW  i.s  capable 
of  purcgasing  and  storing  a  commodity  at  constant  unit  cost,  (3,  nnd 
where  the  two  countt'iea  are' G<IPable  of  producing  the  good  in  the 
next period. 
[Figure  5  about  here] 
(8)  A  similar  (:xample  was  used  by  ICaq.>  (1988)  to  show  that  market 
power  may  be  di.sadvantageous  when  a  dominant  firm  faees  :1 
dynamic:  competitive  fringe  with  rational  expectations. 30 
The  only  equilibrium  price  IS  /3.  Take  an  arbitrary  level  of 
investment for  the  two  countries and  a  corresponding  marginal cost, 
labelled  MC  in  figure  5;  MC  is  the  marginal  cost  of  producing  the 
total  level of  exports  and  thus  represents an aggregation  of  the  two 
exporters' marginal cost curves.  (That is,  MC  gives  the  marginal cost 
of  a  multiplant  monopolist).  If the  countries  cooperate  in  the  second 
period they will  choose  a  tax  to induce  production at  the  point  where 
marginal  revenue  equals  marginal  cost.  For  this  to  result  in  the 
.':' 
price  /3,  the  excess  demand  curve  must  be  the  curve  AB,  shown  in 
figure  5.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  countries  do  not  cooper'at.e  in 
the  second  period, marginal revenue  will  be less  than 
marginal  cost,  and production will occur at  a  point  like xn  In  the 
figure.  The  excess  demand  function  :\ 'B'  IS  induced  by  the 
equilibrium  level  of  investment  by  ROW.  The  ::;haded  area  in  the 
figure  represents  the  increase  in  profits  (i.e.,  produc:er  !:iul'plus) 
resulting  from  non-cooperation  in  the  second  pet-joe!.  The  same 
argument  holds  for  any  level of investment  in  the  two  exporting 
countries.  Therefore  ,J*n  lies above J*c. 
We  summarize  the  implications  of  this  example  a::; 
Proposition  5:  The  welfare  rank.ing  of  regimes  for  t.he  exporting 
countries  is  as  follows:  Lhe  first  besL  is  to  COOpf!rate  on  selling 
investment  policies,  but  not  production  policies;  the  next  best  is  t.o 
eooperate  on  neither  type  of  policie::;;  the  third  best  is  La  cooperate 
on  both  types  of  policies;  the  worst  is  La  cooperate  on  production 
policies  but not investment policies. 
This  seetion  demonstrates  that  making  the  model  more  rpalistic, 
by  including  investment  in  ROW,  is  likely  to  strengthen  rathel'  than 31 
weaken  the condutiion of the  previous  seCtion. 
Conclusion 
The  principal  point  of  this  paper  has  been  to  show  that  limited 
international  cooperation  in  setting  policies  that  influence 
non-competitive  industries  may  backfire:  partial  cooperation  may  be 
worse  than  no  cooperation.  This  conclusion  is  very  much  in  the 
spirit  of  the  "theorem  of  the  second  best",  which  tells  us  that  in  a 
.~, 
market  with  many  distortions,  the  nominal  reduction  of one  distortion 
does  not  necessarily  increase  efficiency.  Similarly,  in  an  economy 
with  many  missing  markets,  the addition of one  market  may  lower  the 
welfare  of  all  agents  [e.g.,  Newbery  and  Sliglil;r.  (198·1)].  The 
contribution  of  this  paper  has  been  to  describe  situations  under 
which  the  possibility  of  disadvantageous  internaLional  cooperation  is 
likely. 
This  paper  brings  logether  several strands  of literature.  Section 
1  extends the Salant et a1.  (1983)  paper  to  a  trade  setting.  Section  2 
uses  the  basic  Spencer  and  Brander  (1983)  model,  but  eXL"ifnincs  a 
different equilibrium and  addr'esses  a  very  different  question. 
The  basic  point of  the  pape~.'  however,  is  closely  ndated  to  many 
other  papers;  this  is  most  evidcmt  in  the  third  section.  The  logic  of 
that  section  is  silflilar  Lo  that  of  ~\fasl{in  and  :--Jf  .. wbf~ry  (1 C188) ,who 
show  that  mOClopRony  power  lIlay  be  disadv:.lni.3g'eol.ts  in  a  t.wo  period 
game  with  a  nonl'cnf]wabl(~  n:source.  Oloma  d  ale  (1981)  show  t.hat 
mergers  may  be  disadvantageous  in  a  genera]  equilibrium  framework; 
this  paper  also  discusses  previous  work  un  disauvantageotl::;  !1lonopoly 
and  disadvantag-eol.ls  synclicat(~s.  I\arp  (1 ~87)  :jbows  that  1I1011op::;ony 
power  may  be  disadvalllngnous  in  a  reproducible  g'oou  U10dpl  with 32 
adjustment cost.s.  Lapan  (1988)  uses  a  t.w·o  period  general equilibrium 
model  to  show  that  the  optimal  tariff  is  time  inconsistent,  and  that 
both.  the  importer  and  exporter  are  worse  off  at  the  perfect 
equilibrium  than  at  the  inconsistent  equilibrium.  (9)  Farr~ll  and 
Gallini  (1987)  show  t.hat  a  monopolist  who  sells  a  product  t.hat 
requires  consumers  to  incur  a  "start-up  cost"  may'  benefit  from 
future  competiton;  if  we  think  of  future  competition  as  b(~ing  like 
failure of  a  group of firms  to  cooperate,  their result is  similar  t.o  the 
others  discussed  here.  Rogoff  (1985)  shows  that  international 
monetary  coordination  may  be  disadvantageous.  Kehoe  (1986)  shows 
that  international  fiscal  cooperation  in  a  two  period  game  may  be 
disadvantageous;  the  reason  has  t.o  do  with  the  effect  of  cooperatlrn 
on  the  savings  decisions  of  individuals.  This  list.,  although  certainly 
not  complete,  demonstrates  growing  recognition  that  the  inability  to 
make  commitments  may  alter  a  problem  to  such  an  extent  t.hat 
conclusions  which  might  onee  have  seemed  obvious  aJ'(~  now  seen  to 
be incorrect. 
Deneckere  and  Davidson  (1985)  demonstrate  that  the 
disadvantageous  merger  result  of  Salant  et.  al.  does  not  hold  if  firms 
play  a  price  setting  rather  than  a  quantity  setlinhi  game.  We 
conjecture  that  t.he  customs  union  is  less  likely  to  be 
disadvantageous  if firms  choose  price  rat.her  t.han  quan Lity. 
Perry  and  Porter  (1985)  show  that  the  disadvanlageous  mer"gel' 
result  is  less  likely  to  hold  if  a  merhier  leads  1.0  a  rlm:rease  in  I he 
marginal cost of  production;  Farrell and  Shapiro  (1988)  provide  a 
(9)  Lapan  dons  not  mention  the  possibility  of  disadvantageous 
monopoly  power,  although  t.he  gr~nernl  equilibrium  properties  of 
the  model  do  not  rule out  t.hat  pOBsibility. 33 
more  general  treatment  of  this  issue.  .  This  consideration  IS  alr;o 
relevant  to  the  international  trade  model  of  Section  1.  If  the 
marginal  cost  of  the  union's  production  lies  below  the  marginal  ~ost 
of  a  single  nation's  production,  the  imperfectly  competiHve  n<liure  of 
rivals  is  less  likely  to  make  cooperation  amongst  a  subset  of  nations 
disadvantageous.  In  this  sense,  t.aking  capital  into  account,  as  in 
Perry and  Porter,  leads  to  the  conclusion  that cooperation  is  unhkely 
to  be  disadvantageous.  However,  their  modification  accommodates 
.~~ 
capital  In  a  restricted  manner:  viz,  aggregate  capital  is  assumed  to 
be  fixed,  ::;0  that  a  merger  can  be  viewed  as  a  reallocation  of  capital. 
As  section  2  of our  paper  shows,  making the aggregate  level  and  '"lot 
simply  the  distribution  of  capital  endogenous  introduces  u  po\\"(~rful 
force  that  may  make  cooperation  disadvantageous. 
The  critical  assumption  in section  2  is  that  lIalion~  may  u(,)  able 
to  cooperate  on  certain  clearly  defined  policies,  ::;uch  :.:s  (H'od Liction 
and  export  lax/subsidies,  but  find  it  difficult  to  cooperate  un  more 
fundamental  policies  which  directly  affect  investment.  This  appears 
to  be  a  reasonably  accurate  de:c;cripLion  of  international  attempts  at 
cooperation,  such  as  those  between  the  U.S.  and  Canada  and  among 
the  EC  nationt>.  In  these  sitmiiions  the  comlIlOll  belief  thaL  partial 
cooperation  is  a  step  in  the  right  dir'ection  may  be  \vr'ong. 
Section  contains  the  star!test  f~xample  of  disad  van tag-cous 
cooperation;  this  is  based  on  an  extreme  fonn  of  supply  response  in 
ROW.  TIli:,>  example  shows  that  the  r0sulls  of  Section  2  al'(~ 
strengthened  if  capit.al in  ROW  is  made  endogenous. 
In  nl;j.{otiaLing  bilateral  trade  n;;recrnenls,  natiom,  have  paid 
insufficient· attention  to  the  possihly  advct'se  illcentives  cJ:f~ated  by 
parlial  cooperalion.  We  interpret  th(~  rc~sulL:::;  (If  lhis  paper'  :IS  an 34 
encouragement  for  more  comprehensive  agreements  rather  than  an 
indictment of  previous attempts  to foster  cooperation. Appendix  A 
aw.  aTT.  ax.  aTT.  a~~k 
l. 
1  (m  - 1) 
1  _J  (n  m) 
1 
as.  =  ax.  +  - aXk  as.  * 
as. 
1  si  =Sm  J  1  1 
aTT. 
[(m 
ax.  ax  ]  ax. [::Jl 
1.  1)  -1  (n  m) 
I,  1 
ax  - +  - as  as.  as  -i  m  m  1 
aTT.  aTT.  ax.  ax. 
by using  (3).  Noting thot 
1  1  and that  _J  1  by 
a~.:  =  ax. 
-- as  as  -i  J  m  m 
symmetry  we  con write the above  expression as 
(31'! .  aTT.  [(m -
ax.  [ax.  aXil  1.  1  1) 
1  -1 
as. 
=:: 
ax  am  +  + 
* 
aSi  as. 
1  si~Sm  -i  m  1 
[ ax  ax.  aXk  aXi 1 ] rXf  (n - m)  k  J. 
+  as.  as  - as  ac•  as  ~. 
1  m  m  1  m 
By  using  (1)  and  (2)  and  after  some  calculations  we  finally  get  the 
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AileI'  r'ouline  manipulations  and  by  using  (1)  and  (2)  we  finally  gel 
l hr:  e::pression in  the text. 36 
Appendix  B:  Slretch  of  Equilibrium for  Linear  Model 
Inver!.';(~  demand  is given by  p  = 1  +  e  - (ql  +  q2)/2;  variable 
cost  is  ci  = [(1  ~ k.)  +  Y q./2]q.;  investment  cost  is v.  = 
111  1 
(1  +  ~ k./2)jk..  The  solution to the non-cooperative quantity setting 
1  1 
game  betwepn  finns  is 




where  AO 
:::  ,  I) ,  = (1,  1) 
.5  l+y 
and sand k  are vectors.  Thl~ payoff to firm  1  in the second period 
is the quadratic  form 
This  e::pression uses  the following definition: 
= 
Q '  =  1 







(1,  0) 
( I) , 
.  1  AOI) 
(I) , ,\  + 
,  1 "0 " 
.5] 
o  A O ' 
1  "  - 2: 
I)'A  I)e~ 
1 
l)'AOIl  - l)'AI)e 
(B.2) 
If the'  governments  behave non-cooperatively,  governmenl  1'5 
objectivr:'  is to  choose  51  to maximize  TTl  minus  the cost  of the 37 






Government  2  has  a  similar maximization problem.  Define the 
permutation matrix P = [~..  ~)  The  first  order condition for 
government  1  is 
o . 
The  system of first order conditions  is  then 
where  Co  =  QiB3Q 
C1  =  [~-~~] 
Q1B4P 
CO")  [9iA 1  ]  = 
QiAIP 
(B.3) 
Define  C,., 
-] 
C4 
-1  that the equilibrium subsidy is  = Cz 
'C
O ,  = C2  Cl  ,  so 
.) 
(B.4) 
If the  C"overnments  do  cooperate,  the joint payoff  (firm profits 
les~;  subsidy costs)  is W = WI  +  W 2, 
1  s'1\:l
l
::.:;  .  .,  (D.5) 
which  uses  lh~ definitions 38 
"i  =  '\ 
+  PAIr 
n*  '1  =  (I +  P)Il1 
n* 
0'  B.,  +  PB.,P  ., 
n%  -:  (1  ,I·  p'n 
•  I  '3 
n*  Btl  .,  PB  P  4  ,1 
l\faximization with respect  to  !:.:  require 
where  =  A*-lr.* 
ill  '"  .  u  ,\rln* '  , 1  4 
(D.G) 
We  nm."  step back  to period  1,  Gnd  f:irst  consider the casp  \vhere 
governments  do  not  cooperate.  Substituting  (E.4)  into  (B.2)  gives 
firm l'  s  equilibrium payoff as  Cl  function  of 1.,  GS 
rrn  =  DO  -l- D'k  - 1.  h'D~k  1  1  2  "  (B.7) 
Substituting  (B.4)  into  (B.3)  gives  the payoff to government  1  as 
a  function of k, 
=  CB.8) 
The  definition of D.,  i  = 0,1, ... ,5  are obtained by performing the 
1. 
substitutions. 
Firm l's problem is to choose kl to maximize  rr~  given by  (B.7), 
less  the private cost  of investment,  [(1  - <1>1)  - t' k/2]1\1'  Firm  2 
faces  an  analog'ous  problem.  Their  equilibritun decision results  in  a 
linear- sy~;telll 39 
=  (D.9) 
\Vhcn~ EO  and  El  an.'  obtained from  th(~ purameters of the  firms  maximi-
zation  prolJlelll,  describeu above. 
Government  1  chooses  ct>l  to maximize  W~ r;iven  1n  (B.8),  less  t.he 
soci",l  cost  of  investment,  (l -- (?  kl /2)k
1
.  Using  (n.9)  to eliminate k 
gives  government  l's maximand  as  a  function  of  ct>.  We  follow  a 
parallel procedure  to obtain government  2'5 maximand.  The  equili-
liri  Wll  of th!:,  resulting non-cooperative  ~ame gives  the equilibrium 
value of 0. 
When  thf'  r;overnments  cooperatr.  in setting s,  the procedure is 
e~~c:tly as  :lbo\,Io.' ,  e}~r;ept  that  the  rule  given by  (B.G),  rather than 
(B. 4),  is used. 40 
TQblt~  1  Comparison  of Equilibria under  Second  Period Cooperat ion  Vs 
Non-cooperQtion 
(a)  (b)  (c)  ( d)  (e) 
y  J*c,lJtn  kC/kn  <!>  c/<!>  n  pc/pn  sc/sn 
.95  .0256  1.931  -3.18  1.082  -3.4 
1.1  1.0002  1.706  -2.59  1.081  -3.59 
1.3  1.0253  1.564  -2.32  1. 071  -3.91 
1.5  1.0297  1.500  -2.26  1.061  -4.26 
1.7  1.0288  1.481  -2.30  1.052  -4.63 
1.9  1.0263  1.50:1  -2.39  1.045  -5.005 
Parameter value  e  :::  4,  0:  =  1,  i?  = 
<) 
(a)  Ratio of equilibrium social  payoff under  cooperation  and 
non-cooperation 
(b)  Ratio of equilibrium  investment  levels 
(c)  Ratio of investment  subsidies 
Cd)  Ratio of equilibrium consumer pr'ices 
(e)  Ratio of production subsidies Brander,  J.  and  B. 
International  Markel 
Economics,  18,  83-100. 
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Formation of the custom union increases the equilibrium 
subsidy of non-members 
Fig.  2 
The  equilibrium payoff  to potential union members  may  be 
lower  when  the union  is formed,  due  to  the  increased 
subsidy by non-members. f(m) 
Fig.  3 
n 
Welfare  comparisons  for  the  linear model. 





The  possibility that  second period cooperation is disadvantageous 











The  welfare loss  due  to  second period cooperation when 
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